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In the Supreme Court of
The State of Utah
B. W. MCMAHON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

CIVIL
No. 7673

MELISSA TANNER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
Respondent agrees in general with the statement of
facts set out in the Appellant's Brief, but cannot agree with
the appellant's statement on page 5 of her brief that "The
purchasers (from respondent) ... proceeded to construct an
outdoor theatre on the defendant's land." The fallacy of
this statement is that it assumes the very question that was
tried in the lower court (which found in favor of plaintiff)
and which is presented to this court on appeal.
While this may be considered a case in equity wherein
this court has the jurisdiction to review questions of both
law and fact, yet in so doing, the court must consider the
circumstance that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand, and was therefore in a favorable position to
weigh the testimony. Under these circumstances, the
judgment of the trial court should not be lightly disregarded. The trial court found "the issues of this case in
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favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant." (Tr. p.
101).
We will meet defendant's arguments in the order they
were advanced in her brief.
ARGUMENT
I

Defendant's Contention that Plaintiff is not Entitled
to Relief because of his "Negligence"
In the first place it appears to the writers of this brief
that the use of the terms "negligence" and "carelessness"
by the defendant is confusing. We do not believe that the
word "negligence" has any place in an equity case of this
type not withstanding the fact that it is loosely used in
some of the cases referred to by defendant. Rather the
flllestion is one of diligence or lack of diligence.
The fundamental issue 011 this particular point advanced by the defendant is whether or not this case is one which
warrants the interference of a court of equity. To answer
this question an examination must be made of the conduct
of the plaintiff and of the conduct of the defendant and
whether or not the defendant has changed her position or
would be adversely affected by the action which has now
been taken by the trial court.
The general position taken by the defendant in her
first argument, namely that equity will never intervene if
there is inexcusable "negligence" on the part of the plaintiff, is not the law and is not sustained by the authorities.
Defendant cites the case of Wolfgang vs~ Henry Thiele
Catering Company, an Oregon case, 275 Pacific 33. .That
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3
case does set forth a correct exposition of the equitable
principles. At page 36 the court quotes with approval from
Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (Fourth Edition) Section 8567 as follows:
"As a second requisite, it has sometimes been
said in very general tern1s that a mistake resulting
from the complaining party's ·own negligence will
never be relieved. This proposition is not sustained by the authorities. It would be more accurate to say that vvhere the mistake is wholly
caused by the want of that care and diligence in
the transaction which should be used by every person of reasonable prudence, and the absence of
\vhich \Yould be a violation of legal duty, a court of
equity \Yill not interpose its relief; but even with
this more guarded mode of statement, each instance of negligence must depend to a great extent upon its own circumstances. It is not every
negligence that will stay the hand of the court.
The conclusion from the best authorities seems to
be, that the neglect must amount to the violation
of a positive legal duty.· The highest possible care
is not demanded. Even a clearly established negligence may not of itself be a sufficient ground for
refusing relief, if it appears that the other party
has not been prejudiced thereby."

ln this case the court further quotes with appr9val
from 21 Corpus Juris at page 88 as follows:
"As a general rule a party will not be given
relief against a mistake induced by his own culpable negligence, as against one who was free
from fault, ~~ * * But this rule is not inflexible and
in many cases relief may be granted although the
mistake \Vas not unmixed with some element of
negligence, particularly where the other party has
been in no way prejudiced; * * * Where the act
done by mistake is one calculated to induce others
to take a line of conduct which will put them to
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loss if the mistake is corrected, it ought to be clear ·
that the party asking for relief has been led into
the mistake in spite of the employment of the
highest degree of vigilance. But where no one is
injured by the mistake other than the party himself, and no one has changed his position in consequence of what has been done and of the mistake, relief may be granted even though a high
degree of care has not been exercised. E~ven gross
negligence has been held insufficient to prevent relief for a unilateral mistake made with the knowledge of the other party."
In the first place, in the case now before the court
there was not any gross "negligence" on the part of the
plaintiff. In the second place the defendant did not change
her position on account of anything which the plaintiff did
or failed to do. And in the third place the defendant by her
silence after she discovered the error has sought and now
seeks an unfair advantage and an unjust enrichment. We
submit that this is precisely the case which warrants the
interposition of a court of equity and that the failure to
intervene would result in a miscarriage of justice.
It is true that plaintiff when he called for his deed at
the office of Attorney Clyde did not plat out the description. The proof discloses that the two parcels of land were
almost identical in size. The descriptions were by metes and
bounds. Unless a person were familiar with the precise
dimensions of the two parcels he would not be able to dis..
cern from a reading of the deed or deeds whether the respective parcels were correctly described. Each parcel contained exactly four acres. The parcels were practically identical in shape. The descriptions were almost identical-the
calls being as follows: The west lines 453.09 vs. 458.70;
the north lines being identical 417.78 feet each; the east
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lines 382.47 vs. 376.86 and the south lines 423.71 vs. 425.72.
\Vhen he delivered the deed to the defendant Mr. Clyde
~tated to her that he did not know which parcel was de~c1·ibed in her deed and it was necessary for him to get out
a plat and carefully check the description against the plat
in order to ascertain which parcel was which (Tr. p. 52).
The evidence conclusively shows, as we hereinafter
point out, that there was an agreement between plaintiff
and defendant that the plaintiff was to get the east parcel
and the defendant the west parcel. Inasmuch as there was
no dispute about that point the plaintiff when he called for
his deed did not display any undue want of care or diligence
in the transaction in not attempting to plat out the description contained in his deed. He assumed that the deeds had
been drawn in keeping with the agreement of the parties
and the very fact that he did not check the instrument convinces us that he was relying upon the attorney who drew
the deed and we submit that such conduct is not so lacking in care as to stay the hand of a court of equity. When
the plaintiff sold his four acre tract the defendant had not
recorded her deed and there was nothing on record which
would call the error to the attention of anyone. Moreover
a surveyors lath bearing the words in surveyors blue pencil
"southeast corner of B. W. McMahon's 4 acres" (Tr. p. 31)
was found in place at the southeast corner of the east parcel at the time plaintiff made his sale to the men who
built the Drive In Theatre That physical evidence was
further assurance to the plaintiff and his grantees that
the east parcel was the correct parcel.

We submit that there was no such lack of care on the
part of plaintiff as would amount to the violation of a posi-
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tive legal duty to the defendant so as to preclude the equitable relief granted by the trial court.
In conclusion on this first argument of plaintiff w.~
further point out and emphasize that all of the circum~
stances should be taken into consideration, as the authorities hereinabove quoted direct. The questionable conduct
of the defendant herself is of direct significance. She discovered the error at the time she received her deed on'
about November 30, 1949. Mr. Clyde advised ·her to con~
tact her brother the plaintiff and have the matter straightended out (Tr. p. 54). She did nothing fro:m then until May
29, 1950 when she came to Carbon ·County for Decoration
Day. At that time she discovered that valuable improvements were being. placed upon the east parcel and she toid
her husb~nd who was with her to say nothin~ about it' {'fiJ.
p. 86) . 9n that day she recorded the deed to the east pardel
in her' own· name and neither advised plaintiff ·nor lii~
grantees ·that she claimed the land: upon··which the'lheatt~
was· being constructed. She returned· to ·Salt ··Lake and wait~
J
ed 'Jift:y-one. days until July 19, 1950 (Tr. p. 26) to return
to Carbon County.; and that wa·s the first time that· she in.
.·
.
.
.. .
. !·
.
formed plaintiff's grantees that they were on the wrbng
property and that was afte~ the.theatr'e had ·been conipie~:
ed and was iri operation. She. deliberately s·at by· waitiii'g
for the valuable improvements to be placed ·upo~ ··:th~
property so that she could reap the b~nefits therefr~m. yYe
submit that her conduct cettainly is such that a 'couft' of
equ·ity sho'uld feel impeHed · to interv~ne · artd: ··grahf ·~~lief.
The trial court gave het th~ property which
·w!anted,
namely the· west.:. parcel, and it .was the property :which was
admi~~edly·· .the more valuable tract. The defend::urt: never
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advanced any reason why she wanted the east parcel except
that valuable improvements had been placed thereon and
she wanted to reap the harvest therefrom.
II

Defendant's Contention that the Mistake was not a
Mutual Mistake and is Therefore not Subject to
Reformation
The authorities cited by defendant in connection with
her second argument are all right so far as they go. We
feel,- however, that there is no need to belabor the point
as to whether there is a mutual mistake in the instant case.
The lower court found that there was an agreement that
the plaintiff was to take the east parcel and the defendant
the west parcel and it is admitted by everyone that the
deeds as drawn did not carry out the agreement of the parties. It is true that at the time the deeds were delivered the
plaintiff did not discover the mistake and the defendant did
discover the mistake. Under these circumstances relief
should be granted as set forth in the preceeding argument.
The fol~owing statement set forth in 19 Am. Juris. page 77
under the subject "Mutuality; Mistake on Part of Only One
Party" is applicable :
Relief will be granted where the evidence
shows mistake on the part of one of the parties
and fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the
other. Accordingly, where, unknown to one of the
_parties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering it at variance with the prior understanding
and-agreement of the parties and the other party
learns of this mistake at the time of the execution
of the instrument and later seeks to take advan-
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tage of it, equity will reform the instrument so
as to make it conform to the prior understanding.
In the foot note to the foregoing text the following
excerpt is in point :
It was ruled that equity would grant relief
against the mistake of a complainant in erecting a
dwelling house on a lot which he supposed he had
purchased of the defendant, out of a tract belonging to him, but which, on measurement being
made, was ascertained to be the property of the defendant, and immediately adjoining the lot which
he really had bought, if the defendant stood silently by and saw the complainant progressing with
the work, but permitted him to continue therein.
McKelway v. Armour, 10 N. J. Eq. 115, 64 Am.
Dec. 445.
In the instant case the mistake apparently was not
made by error of the parties but by the scrivener who drew
the deeds. The deeds as drawn can fairly be held to constitute a mutual mistake even though the error was discovered by the defendant, because the deeds did not can~y
out the agreement of the parties. Mr. Clyde testified that
he arbitrarily assigned the parcels. Neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant authorized him to make such an arbitrary assignment and such arbitrary action on his part
would not be binding upon plaintiff and defendant.
III
Defendant's Contention that there is Insufficient Evidence
of any Agreement Between the Parties to Justify a
Reformation of the Deeds

The trial judge was so impressed with the character
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and volume of the evidence given by all of the parties to
this action, including the defendant and her husband, \Vith
respect to the agreement which vvas reached by plaintiff
and defendant that he ruled in favor of the plaintiff from .
the bench and without taking the matter under adviHement
and stated in part as follows:
"THE COURT: ... It appears to me, gentlemen, that there was an agreement had. Apparently
l\lrs. Tanner when she went for her deed expected
that she would get a deed to the V\rest parcel. I
can't explain that speculation unless there had
been an undersanding or that she had chosen the
·west parcel and believed that her choice in that
regard 'vas being acceded to by her brother. And
it seems to the court that the conduct of both parties be,veen the time that the agreement was
dra vvn in the office of Mr. Clyde down to the time
that the deed was delivered to Mrs. Tanner bears
out that conclusion." (Tr. p. 101).
We are satisfied that if the appellate court reads the
transcript in this case that it will be similarly impressed
and convinced. The evidence is preponderous. It not only
supports the decision of the trial court- it demands such a
decision. The evidence is not only of one type or from one
person but all of the words and conduct of all of the parties lead to the inevitable conclusion that a definite agreement was reached between the parties. We summarize
this evidence in part as follows :
(1) Admissions, Statements and Conduct of
Defendant Mrs. Tanner:
The first witness called by the plaintiff was the defendant herself. She testified that after the agreement with
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the. Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation, Plaintiff's Exhibit A,
had be.en entered into .whereby plaintiff and defendant were
granted the right to repurchase the two four-acre tracts,
and. before deeds were delivered to either party, defendant
planted trees and shrubbery on the west tract (Tr. p. 9) and
stated "At that time I, that was the one that I had chosen, I
thought I was going to get." She also stated to Mr. Stevenson, the owner of the service station, that she was going
to ce his neighbor because "I just thought at that 'time
that my brother would consider the west side for me" (Tr.
p. 11).

On cross examination by her own attorney the defendant testified:
"Q. . . . Did you ever express a desire to your brother

as to which tract of land that you would like? The East
or the West?
"A. 'Vell- - "Q. You can answer it yes or no, did you express a preference to your brother?
"A. Well yes, when we first got it.
"Q. Now which side, a~ the beginning, which tract of

laJ?.d did you say you wanted?
"A. I told him that my choice would be on the west
side.
"Q. The west side.

And hoping that you would get it,
you planted trees and shrubs on the west tract, is that correct?
"A. Well, I thought that, yes." (Tr. p. 19).
The defendant, testifying on her own behalf on direct
exam·ination, stated:
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"Q. . . . You have heard the testimony given that; ·bY

your brother that he asked you to designate which tract ·you
wanted?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you said what?

"A. I told him I preferred the west side." (Tr. p. 90).
It should be noted here that defendant was a hostile
witness, and from her statement that she thought her
brother might consider the west side for her, and that she
hoped she would get it, she apparently wished to convey
the idea that the matter had not been settled. However,
this was long before the deeds were delivered and her.~e~ti
mony, later, was that she never
talked with
her brother,
.
.
·.·
the plaintiff, ag~in about the matter. from about No'Y~;mber
11, 1948, until after the action was commenced in 1950 (Tr.
p. 22).
.

·'

.

upon

.the ground
The actions. of the defendant in going
in the spring of the year 1949 four or five months follow ..
ing the meeting in the office of Mr. Clyde and there com
mencing her landscape improvements by planting trees and
shrubs on the west parcel is irrefutable 'evidence that an
agreement had been made between her and her brother because if no such agreement had been made she would not
have started to landscape the west parcel. She wanted the
west parcel from the beginning. She chose it upon being
granted her f~rst choice.. The evidence shows that the ·west
tract had be.~n cul~ivated, was more level and .free .:from
rocks::a.nd. boulders, .-while the east tract. had .in it. a rocky
knoll~:·i~oulder~ ;~~d an ·.old reser·v~ir,. nutking. )t ~~~~-,:\4esir··· .
'

.

.

. .

'

.

.

..,;

··~

"
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able for building purposes (Tr. p. 59). The trial court in his
op1nion stated,
"THE COURT: I may be in error about this
but I think I am right in the conclusions that I
have reached and I don't think that this will result in any loss to the defendant because undoubtedly the west parcel in this area will probably be
of greater value to her than the east parcel." (Tr.
p. 102).

(2) Statements and Admissions made by
Defendant to Edward W. Clyde, a Disinterested Witness
in the Lawsuit:
Mr. Edward Clyde, Attorney at Law, and draftsman of
the deeds and contract with the Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation, testified that when the defendant came for her deed,
and learned that it described the east tract, said:
"A. She said, 'This is the wrong piece,' and I
said, 'What do you me,an it is the wrong piece,' and
she said, 'Ben and I agre,ed that he would take this
one and that I would get the other one, ' ... Well,
Ben and I agreed that he get this piece and I would
get the other one.' 'Now I said, 'Mrs. Tanner, you
mean agreed or you mean just talked about it.'
And she said, 'We understood that was the way it
was to be,' and I don't remember which one of them
she said, but she said one of us planted some trees
or plants on the piece we are to get and I am getting the wrong piece. She requested me to straighten it up and I told her that I couldn't, that the deed
was already delivered to Ben and I told her that if
she contacted Ben that he would straighten it up.
And she said, "No he wouldn't, he has tricked me
again." I then told her that I didn't think Ben
knew which piece he had, tha;t I hadn't shown him
on the plat. But I thought if he contacted her it
would be straightened out again. And she said,
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.. No, he has just tricked me again" And paid the

$100 and took the deed (Tr. p. 53-54).
Mr. Clyde testified further that the defendant called
him on the telephone after the construction on the theatre
had been commenced if not completed, and he reminded her
· ' '·that she wanted the west tract' "and that you said you and
Ben had agreed that you'd get this piece and he'd get the
other one. Now this is your chance to get the piece that you
wanted, just try him," and she said, "Well, I don't know
whether I want to do that or not, I will think about it." (Tr.
p. 55).
The words emphasized in defendant's admissions to
Mr. Clyde as above set forth do not suggest a mere "declaration of conflicting preferences" as suggested by Mr.
Maw in his brief, but on the contrary impel the conclusion
that the parties had reached a definite and clearcut agreement. The trial court was so impressed.
(3) Statements of Mr. Paul L. Tanner, the Husband
of Defendant
Mr. Paul L. Tanner, the husband of the defendant, was
present at the office of Mr. Clyde and on direct examination he stated that "after the agreement was drawn up it
was necessary to decide which plot was going to which one
and Mr. Clyde pressed them to make a choice and the choice,
first choice finally after going back and forth ended up with
Mrs. Tanner expressing a preference for the west piece, parcel of land." (Tr. pp. 76 and 77). He goes on to say that' the
plaintiff just made the comment by way of exclamation
"that is the parcel I wanted." This witness states that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
they may have talked about the matter after they left the
office but he could not remember (Tr. p. 78).
Tanner also accompanied his wife to Mr. Clyde's office \\7hen she picked up the deed and he quotes his wife
as saying on that occasion: "I thought I was going to get
the west parcel" (Tr. p. 79).
Mr. Tanner accompanied his wife to Carbon County
th~ day before Decoration Day the following spring, that
is on May 29, 1950. Both he and his wife saw the improvements going up on the east parcel. Tanner states:

"And when she saw the improvements on that
property she immediately said to me, Now don't
you say a word to Woody [the plaintiff] when we
are here about that, that I own the east property.
She says, Don't you say a word. So we went up
there and for once I followed her orders, I didn't
say anything." (Tr. p. 86).
Tanner testified that he helped his wife plant the
shrubbery on the west parcel.
"Q. And you planted those trees after you
knew that your vvife had chosen that parcel? [ The
west parcel ] .
"A. After she had chosen it, that's right."
(Tr. p. 88).

(4) Testimony of B. W. McMahon, Plaintiff:
The sister, Mrs. Tanner, was given her choice. Mr.
Clyde urged that they come to a decision. The plaintiff
said:
" 'Well, let Melissa [ the defendant ] make her
choice.' He, [ Mr. Clyde ] insisted that we should

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
make the choice now and the choice was 1nade at
that time.
"Q. In his presence ?
A. In his presence.
Q. Did he hear?
A. I don't know about that. It was made in
his presence.
Q. But you didn't make, determine for yourself that he knew which piece you were to get and
\vhich she was to get?
A. Well that's what he said I did. But I don't
know. He asked me, 'Is that OK with you Mac?'
I said, 'Yes.' 'I give her her choice and that is OK
with me.' " (Tr. pp. 65 and 66).
On May 29, 1950, the day before Decoration Day, the
plaintiff narrates the following statements as having been
made:
"A. My wife said to lVIrs. Tanner, said, "We
have sold our 4 acres of ground there and they
are putting up a drivein theater."
Q." Did Mrs. Tanner say anything to that?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?
A. "Yes, so I noticed, so vve noticed." "Yes,
so we noticed."

On cross examination the plaintiff stated to Mr. Maw,
"I told her [the defendant] that was the side that my
choice would have been."
( 5) Agnes McMahon, Wife of Plaintiff:
Her statements corroborate the statements of her husband (Tr. pp. 69 to 74 inclusive).
(6) Admissions made by Defendant to Mario Marchino,
Phillip Turner and Bernard W. Cline, Grantees
from the Plaintiff:
These three men went to Salt Lake City on or about
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July 19, 1950 for the express purpose of talking with the
defendant and her husband about the problem which confronted them. Mr. Marchino testified that the defendant
at said time and place told them that,
"Although that her and her brother, B. W.
McMahon, had agreed that she was to take the
west parcel and B. W. the east parcel, why now
that the theater was on the west [ east ] parcel
that naturally that was the most valuable and that
was the land she wanted." (Tr. p. 27).
Mr. Turner testified as to the conversation in Salt
Lake in the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Tanner as follows:
"And she said that she and her brother Ben
had agreed on which piece of ground was to belong
to who and she had chosen the west parcel and he
the east parcel. She also said ·at that time tha.t
she thought that it was better for him to have the
east parcel because the electricity was there at the
corner of that piece or ground where it would be
easy for him to hook on ~:ld later when she decided
to build she could put the electricity down to her
place." (Tr. p. 43).
Mr. Bernard W. Cline testified with respect to the
conversation in the home of defendant and her husband
at Salt Lake City:
"Q. Was anything said as to the respective
ownership of the east and west parcels?"
"A. Yes ::: ::: * and that there had been a definite agreement of who was to have what piece
of land, and I believe even they mentioned contacting the lawyers in Salt Lake City concerning
the mistake that had been made."
"Q. Did they say what mistake had been

made?
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·'A. Yes, she said that they were to receive the
west, I don't want to get confused here, but they
were to receive the west part and Woody was to
receive the east part." (Tr. pp. 48 and 49).
Although both the defendant and her husband were
called as witnesses and although both of them were present
on the occasion testified to by all three of the above wit-,
nesses, neither the defendant nor her husband denied by
way of rebuttal or otherwise any of the statements attri~
buted to them by said three witnesses. Those admissions
therefore stand undenied.
( 7) The Significance of the Time of Recording the
Deed on May 29, 1950:
All of the testimony offered by both plaintiff and defendant is to the effect that the defendant had her choice
and she chose the west tract. It was only after she discovered valuable improvements going up on the east tract
that she expressed a desire for that one. Defendant's deed
to the east tract was recorded May 29, 1950 at 10:13 A. M.
(Exhibit A of plaintiff's complaint). :Plaintiff's wife,
Agnes McMahon, testified that both parties were at the
Sunnyside cemetery (approximately 30 miles from Price,
the county seat) ·between 8:30 and 9 o'clock A. M. "It was
quite early in the morning". Tr. p. 71. "We kind of sensed
something was wrong but we couldn't figure out wha~ it
was, but they did come and have a cup of coffee and they
wouldn't wait until I fixed anything to eat so they just
had the coffee and a piece of cake." (Tr. pp. 71 and 72).
The defendant testified :
"Q. And you arrived there [at Sunnyside
cemetery] rather early in the morning, did you
riot, 8 or 9 o'clock?"
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"A. Oh no, we couldn't ever get here at 8
o'clock. I don't know, it must have been between
9 and 10 I guess." (Tr. p. 12).
Yet the defendant testified " ... When we were going
to ·nragerton, when we came through Price we stopped and
had our deed recorded and then we went on to Dragerton."
(Tr. p. 15).

Defendant says they stopped at Price on their way to
Dragerton, and recorded the deed, arriving there "it must
have been between 9 and 10 I guess," a distance of some
thirty miles, and yet the deed shows that it was recorded at
10:13 A. M.
After holding the deed for several months, through
the winter, without recording, it is more likely that defendand went to Dragerton, taking the deed with the purpose of
notifying the plaintiff of the mistake and making an exchange. But when, on passing the two tracts, it was discovered that extensive and valuable improvements were being made on the east tract, the one to which she held the
deed, she decided not to "say anything to Woody about it"
{Tr. p. 92) and rushed back to Price and had the deed recorded.
( 8-) Summary on Defendant's Third Contention:

In light of the overwhelming and conclusive testimony
to the efftct that there was an agreement between the parties and in light of the conduct of the defendant in landscaping the west parcel as well as the conduct of the plaintiff in taking possession of the east parcel it seems useless
to further belabor this subject. The defendant in her
hrief attempts to explain away the admissions which she
made to Mr. Clyde to the effect that she and the plaintiff
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''agreed'' on a division of the land. It is suggested by counsel for defendant that defendant didn't mean "agreed"
when she said "agreed." As is demonstrated in subdivision
(1) of this third argument, the defendant, Mrs. Tanner
not only used the word "agreed" but she used the words
chosen, that she had received the wrong piece, that her
brother had tricked her, etc. The admissions made by defendant to Mr. Clyde are in and of themselves conclusive
proof that an agreement had been reached between plaintiff and defendant.
. CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit that the order made by the
trial court directing a reformation of the deeds has full
warrant of judicial precedent and authority and that the
same is the only just and proper order which could be
made in the premises because the defendant will still obtain the more valuable piece of property in its unimproved
condition in accordance with her admitted choice and preference and the order made will prevent her from becoming unjustly enriched through her unworthy actions in
knowingly sitting by and awaiting the completion of $30~000.00 worth of improvements (Tr. p. 29) upon the east
parcel.

Respectfully submitted:
HAMMOND & HAMMOND
and
THERALD N. JENSEN

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
Price, Utah
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